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Abstract 
The study of public diplomacy often proceeds with an empirical approach, focusing on crafting 
policy instruments and measuring policy efficiency. But this approach tends to render descriptive 
and quantitative results. This paper contextualizes public diplomacy in theoretical terms, 
institutional structure, and policy priority, and points out three common misconceptions in 
comparison of U.S.-China public diplomacy. It means to draw attention to normative and 
qualitative approaches that should be applied to the fledging interdisciplinary study of public 
diplomacy.  
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Misconceptions in Comparative Study of Public Diplomacy: A U.S.-China Case Study 
  
 Overview 
China‘s fast rise in the past three decades from an isolated backwater leftist 
regime to a top-tier economic and political power is an historic phenomenon. 
China‘s economic success poses challenges to the status quo of the world order on 
two levels.  
First, it demonstrates that developing countries can bypass Western-style 
economic privatization, market absolutism and democratic institutions to achieve 
economic fulfillment and political independence. Inspired by the showcase of 
China, Third World countries think that their survival could be bettered by cherry-
picking the adaptable parts of the Western development model and availing 
themselves of foreign investments and technologies without themselves becoming 
Westernized. China‘s model of development, coined as ―The Beijing Consensus‖ 
by Joshua Cooper Ramo in 2004, could chip away the viability of the U.S. model 
prescribed in the Washington Consensus, and promote an alternative worldview 
that reinforced by the U.S.-led West and commonly shared by the international 
community. 
Second, fueled by its growing economic and political power, China‘s 
national interests have become more diversified and expanding. China has become 
more assertive in territorial disputes over islands in the East and South China Seas. 
It has increased its defense budget substantially in recent year to upgrade military 
weaponry. China has also gone on the defensive against Western criticism on its 
human rights records and authoritarianism and has insisted on the legitimacy of its 
political system at the present stage of social development. China, once a follower 
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of the international order during its process of integration into the world, is now 
trying to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve 
its interests. In addition to its mighty presence in the UN and WTO, China‘s 
marching footsteps have been found in international financial institutions usually 
dominated by the West. It has gained over 6% membership quotas in IMF, 
becoming the third largest power in this institution. China‘s share in World Bank 
has also risen to 4.42%, next to Japan and the U.S. China now has the will and 
capacity to pursue its own global agenda. 
Against this backdrop is a seeming decline of U.S. power. America‘s 
excessive use of military force in the Middle East and increasing number of cases 
of human rights abuse in secret prisons around the globe turned international 
sympathy for the U.S. after 9/11 into international outrage. The global financial 
crisis that broke out in 2008, with the Wall Street at the eye of the storm, dragged 
down the national economy and put a huge question mark on the viability of the 
U.S. development model based on deregulation, overconsumption and 
hyperfinancialization. Edward Snowden‘s revelation on the U.S. National Security 
Agency‘s blanket surveillance on a global scale compromises the moral height of 
the U.S. as the advocator of democracy and freedom. It seems that a rebalance of 
global power distribution is in process. 
The point of concern about the rebalance is that the U.S. and China are 
heterogeneous powers in terms of political and social institutions, ideology and 
culture. This generates a vicious circle of distrust. On the one hand, the U.S.-led 
West worries that China is becoming a rogue force that will overhaul the 
international order; on the other hand, suspicious about U.S. strategic intention to 
contain China‘s rise, China feels precarious in an adverse external environment. To 
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make the rebalance less disruptive, the U.S., the most powerful custodian of the 
existing West-dominated world order, has to shape a rising China into a responsible 
stakeholder instead of a revolutionary, and China has to demonstrate the peaceful 
intention of its rise. Therefore, public diplomacy is needed to foster a common 
ground of mutual respect and understanding between the two countries.  
China has made enormous public diplomacy efforts to assure the U.S. and 
the world of its goodwill and to make its message of peace and harmony heard and 
understood. When Russia invaded Georgia‘s South-Ossetia region in 2008, Beijing 
was hosting the Summer Olympics with extravagance and courtesy. When the 
world economy was at the peak of the financial crisis in 2010, China hosted 
Shanghai Expo, inspiring the world with technological innovation and new 
investment opportunities. Since 2005, under the endorsement of the Chinese 
government and in collaboration with American education institutions, 97 
Confucius Institutes and 357 Confucius Classrooms have been established across 
the U.S., serving as Chinese culture and language education centers.
1
 In terms of 
international broadcasting, the Chinese government has allegedly spent $7.1 billion 
to expand the overseas outlets of its media.
2
 Flagship state-run media, such as 
China Central Television, Xinhua News Agency and China Daily all have 
established state-of-the-art facilities either in New York or Washington, D.C., and 
have started localizing their productions in the U.S.  
The U.S. is also becoming more public diplomacy savvy in handling U.S.-
China relations. When President Obama visited China in 2009, he creatively held a 
town hall meeting with over 400 Chinese university students. He greeted the 
audience with local dialect, and advocated the universal value of freedom of 
expression, religious belief, access to information and political participation. The 
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event was live streamed online in China and reviewed positively by young Chinese. 
The U.S. Embassy in China is keen to use social media to conduct public 
diplomacy in China. For instance, the Embassy has kept posting Beijing air quality 
data recorded by the Embassy‘s facility on Weibo – China‘s most popular social 
media platform. This measure strengthened environmental protection awareness 
among China‘s civil society and created popular pressure on the Chinese authorities 
to upgrade its air quality monitor standard. At the same time, the U.S. Embassy also 
took these opportunities to share information about the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency and Clear Air Act on Weibo to advocate U.S. environmental 
policy. 
This kind of checklist-like quantitative comparison can help the two 
countries draw lessons from each other‘s policy practice. However, without 
contextualizing public diplomacy in clearer theoretical, institutional, and policy 
frameworks, this kind of comparison can also be misleading because it correlates 
the quantity of public diplomacy measures with their effects, and engenders policy 
contest with no clear purpose. 
  
 Theoretical Misconception 
According to liberal international relations theory, the fundamental actors in 
international politics are individuals and private groups who are rational and risk-
averse. They communicate and take collective action to promote differentiated 
interests under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values and 
variation in societal influence. States represent some subset of domestic society, 
and it is on the basis of the subset‘s interests that state officials define state 
preferences and act purposively in world politics. The configuration of 
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interdependent states‘ preferences determines state behavior. (Moravcsik, 1997) In 
the liberalist view, international and domestic spheres are inextricably linked. 
States‘ internal structures determine whether their relations are cooperative or 
conflictual; more focus should be given to the precise interactions between 
individuals and states. (Slaughter, 2000) 
The rationale behind public diplomacy is based on the assumption that 
government policy should be responsive and responsible to its citizens‘ public 
opinion. Therefore, country A could shape the public opinion in country B through 
direct communication and exchange with the public of country B, and hence 
indirectly influence country B‘s government policy towards country A. In this 
sense, by targeting societal actors to shape representation and state preference, 
public diplomacy is a liberal approach to diplomacy and international relations. It 
inherently embraces the ideal of interdependence, cooperation and mutual 
understanding, and is non-excluding in its nature.  
However, in reality, people often view public diplomacy through the lenses 
of realist power politics, partly because of the popularization of the concept of ―soft 
power‖ that blurs the line between liberalism and realism. According to realist 
international relations theory, in international politics the only important collective 
actor is state; power determines the outcomes of state interaction; state can be 
treated as if their dominant preference were for power (Slaughter, 2000). It stresses 
the exclusiveness of power politics and hegemon. It leads to a comparative and 
competitive view on a nation‘s ability to coerce or induce another nation to perform 
a course of action. Scholars and diplomats have often view public diplomacy as a 
measure to craft a nation‘s soft power, and consider the persuasion and 
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communication ingrained in public diplomacy as calculated measures to add up to 
soft power.  
This theoretical misconception leads to the misunderstanding of the 
relations between soft power and public diplomacy. Joseph Nye (2008) pointed out:  
The resources that produce soft power arise…from the values…a country 
expresses in its culture, in the examples it sets by its internal practices and 
policies, and in the way it handles its relations with others. Public diplomacy is 
an instrument that governments use to mobilize these resources to communicate 
with and attract the publics of other countries. (p.94)  
In other words, soft power is an organic quality of a country exuding naturally from 
its history, culture, social and political institutions. Public diplomacy is an 
international political communication practice that makes a country‘s soft power 
more visible, audible, tangible and comprehensible. Public diplomacy ―sells‖ a 
country‘s soft power as it is; it doesn‘t produce soft power.  
U.S.-China public diplomacy has always been framed in a zero-sum mode. 
Senator Richard G. Lugar argued that U.S. was in deficit in terms of public 
diplomacy competition with China.
3
 Senator Dana Rohrabacher called for 
establishing a reciprocal relationship between the number of visas issued to state-
controlled media workers in China and in the United States.
4
 In 2010, over 170 
University of Chicago faculty members petitioned against the establishment of a 
Confucius Center and called the center an academically and politically ambiguous 
initiative sponsored by the Chinese government and a risk to the university 
reputation. 
Correspondingly, U.S. public diplomacy practitioners also sense hostility in 
China. Former U.S. Consul General in Shanghai Beatrice Camp complained that 
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the Chinese government refused to allow the U.S. Consulate General in Shanghai to 
open an American presence post in Nanjing, required U.S. universities to have 
Chinese partners, and restricted the number of U.S. movies that can be shown in 
China. Her impression was that the Chinese government was not always 
comfortable with the U.S. public diplomacy practitioners‘ efforts to speak directly 
to the Chinese people, and sometimes even cancelled the U.S. public diplomacy 
programs without explaining the reasons.
5 
 
It is obvious that the theoretical misconception also causes confusion of 
public diplomacy and propaganda. To start a comparative study of public 
diplomacy, a fine line between propaganda and public diplomacy has to be drawn. 
Propaganda is a form of disinformation, which is set to produce an emotional 
response from the audiences. It has destructive intention to gain ground by 
defaming the adversary and whitewashing oneself. On the contrary, public 
diplomacy stresses on the impartial dissemination of information, truth telling and 
policy interpretation. It intends to decrease misunderstanding, stereotype and 
distrust between countries through candid political and cultural communication and 
exchanges between peoples. It is a win-win and constructive policy practice in 
which the gain of one is not at the cost of the other.  
The confusion about public diplomacy and propaganda has ideological and 
political roots. For China, the biggest liability in its public diplomacy toward the 
U.S. is its regime‘s nature. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rules the Chinese 
government. Due to collective memory of the Cold War antagonism, for 
Americans, communism is strongly correlated with foreign propaganda and 
repressive domestic censorship. Although the CCP has departed from the leftist 
revolutionary mindset and led the country onto a path of state capitalism, a regime 
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that still calls itself ―communist‖ and rhetorically pursues socialist aspiration is 
hard to be appreciated and trusted by the American public. Any public diplomacy 
endeavor carried out by the Chinese government will be viewed as a propaganda 
activity that whitewashes the Communist China and counters American values. 
Although the curriculums and textbooks of the Confucius Institutes are about the 
Chinese language and culture, some Americans view the Confucius Institutes with 
wary eyes and regard them as CCP propaganda outlets. Despite the fact that 
China‘s global push for its media is more for self-explanation than it is an anti-U.S. 
campaign, the presence of the Chinese media in the U.S. – such as CCTV America 
and China Daily USA – has been seen as the localization of CCP‘s propaganda 
machines.  
For the U.S., the biggest liability in public diplomacy towards China was a 
part of an outdated legislation – the Smith-Mundt Act, which banned the domestic 
circulation of publications and broadcasting for U.S. public diplomacy use. This 
was tantamount to announcing that U.S. public diplomacy is an overseas-oriented 
propaganda activity, from which U.S. citizens should be quarantined. This 
undertone gave the Chinese government a good reason to question the intention of 
U.S. public diplomacy in China. Fortunately, on July 2, 2013, the Smith-Mundt 
Modernization Act became effective. It finally broke down the 
compartmentalization of domestic and foreign audiences and introduced 
transparency and candidness into the U.S. public diplomacy effort. 
 
 Institutional Misconception 
It is widely agreed that public diplomacy is a type of government-sponsored 
diplomatic activity. Since government is the major actor in public diplomacy, the 
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government autonomy granted by the political institution of the country decides 
how public diplomacy can be carried out.  
The U.S. government is in a political institution of checks and balances. The 
U.S. economy is based upon market-oriented private entrepreneurship. On the 
contrary, the Chinese government has very centralized power, and state-owned 
enterprises take the lion share of the country‘s economy. When the two countries‘ 
public diplomacy programs are paired up for competitive comparison, the result of 
the comparison is misleading.  
China‘s vibrant public diplomacy programs benefit from the fact that 
China‘s highly centralized political institution fits the general definition that public 
diplomacy is a government-sponsored effort. China is a country with strong state 
and weak society. The Chinese government seldom worries about checks and 
balances with regard to budget making. It can effectively mobilize astronomical 
amount of money to boost certain programs that it values, such as vigorous global 
expansion of Chinese media outlets and the Confucius Institutes.  
However, although China seems to have formidable numbers of public 
diplomacy programs, a closer check reveals that China‘s public diplomacy 
resources are scattered and tangled in a complicated bureaucratic system. The 
cultural exchange programs are in the charge of Ministry of Culture; the education 
exchange programs are in the charge of Ministry of Education; the international 
broadcasting is in the charge of Publicity Department of the Central Committee of 
the CCP and the State General Administration for Radio, Film and Television; 
foreign aid is in the charge of Ministry of Commerce; the internet-based 
communication programs are in the charge of the Information Office of the State 
Council; political affairs, diplomacy and foreign journalists stationed in China are 
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in the charge of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There is no single central authority to 
fully coordinate the public diplomacy effort.  
In recent years, to ramp up China‘s soft power, Chinese officials and 
scholars have united in their call for making public diplomacy resources even more 
concerted and integrated by the government (Wang, 2008). Take China‘s Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs for example. In 2009, it upgraded the Division of Public 
Diplomacy under the Information Department to the higher level and more heavily 
staffed Public Diplomacy Office to coordinate and mastermind the public 
diplomacy effort of the Ministry, its foreign missions and beyond. The office 
strengthened training programs catering to various tiers of diplomats to make them 
more public diplomacy conscious and more qualified in policy advocacy towards 
foreign audiences.
6
 Under its initiative, the Foreign Ministry established the Public 
Diplomacy Advisory Panel in 2010, mainly composed of retired senior Chinese 
ambassadors. The panel‘s missions are to give public diplomacy policy advice and 
to make public diplomacy campaigns by taking advantage of their diplomacy 
expertise and less sensitive status as retirees.
7 
The Public Diplomacy Office also 
established an inter-ministerial coordination mechanism in an effort to achieve 
better communication between public diplomacy-related ministries in the Chinese 
government.
8
 
On the contrary, the U.S. democratic system features a strong society and 
weak state. Intricate legislations put the government budget under rigid scrutiny of 
the Congress. For example, the Smith-Mundt Act, also called the Information and 
Educational Exchange Act of 1948, strictly regulated government public diplomacy 
activities. It cautiously allocates public financial resources, and puts public 
diplomacy under the supervision of the Congress. Sec 401 mandated:  
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Whenever the Secretary shall use the services, facilities, or personnel of any 
Government agency for activities under authority of this Act, the Secretary shall 
pay for such performance out of funds available to the Secretary under this Act, 
either in advance, by reimbursement, or direct transfer. The Secretary shall 
include in each report submitted to the Congress a statement of the services, 
facilities, and personnel of other Government agencies utilized in carrying on 
activities under the authority of this Act, showing the names and salaries of the 
personnel utilize, or performing services utilized, during the period covered by 
such report, and the amounts aid to such other agencies under this section as 
payment for such performance. 
The Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 also limited the 
proliferation of government-sponsored public diplomacy programs by giving 
preference to private-owned entities, as Sec 502 mandated: 
 In authorizing international information activities under this Act, it is the sense 
of the Congress (1) that the Secretary shall reduce such Government 
information activities whenever corresponding private information 
dissemination is found to be adequate; (2) that nothing in this Act shall be 
construed to give the Department a monopoly in the production or sponsorship 
on the air of short-wave broadcasting programs, or a monopoly many other 
medium of information. 
The spirit of this legislation foretells the future of U.S. public diplomacy. 
Due to limited public funding, public diplomacy programs are heavily subject to 
government fiscal prejudice. Fiscal hardships caused by the economic crisis since 
2008 have led to downsizing public diplomacy. Voice of America was asked to turn 
off its Mandarin Chinese broadcasting service; the 63-year-old Advisory 
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Commission on Public Diplomacy was dismissed for 19 months beginning in 
December 2011.
9
 Due to the institutional preference to the role of private entities in 
public diplomacy, the U.S. government has retreated from the major sponsor to 
major initiator, and a large portion of public diplomacy effort has been relayed to 
the private sector. Hence, the inaction of VOA is not only because of the shortage 
of funding, but also because of the fact that the dominance of U.S. private media 
groups, such as CNN and The New York Times, over the international media sphere 
makes state-run media unnecessary.  
Therefore, if institutional differences are not considered, a mere superficial 
comparison between government-sponsored public diplomacy programs by China 
and the U.S. is invalid. On the one hand, although the Chinese government can 
afford proliferation and upgrade of public diplomacy programs, close affiliation 
with the Chinese government makes many programs seem politically charged and 
ideologically sensitive in the American people‘s view. This negates the 
accessibility and effectiveness of China‘s public diplomacy in the U.S.  
On the other hand, it is not realistic to fit China‘s ―square peg‖ in the U.S. 
―round hole.‖ The best universities in China are all public universities, while in the 
U.S. the best are private. In China, big media companies are all state-owned, while 
in the U.S. big media companies are all private. If the proposals by some U.S. 
Senators to equalize U.S.-China public diplomacy, such as requiring a reciprocal 
number of journalists stationed by state-run media or reciprocal number of culture 
and language institutes funded by government, are implemented, there will be a 
sudden die out of China‘s public diplomacy in the U.S., simply because there is no 
private sector to back it up. Therefore, China‘s massive push of government-
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sponsored public diplomacy programs in the U.S. is an institutional byproduct 
rather than a conspired scheme. 
In contrast, although the U.S. government is diffusing and scaling down its 
public diplomacy programs, the strong presence of U.S. private cultural and 
educational businesses in China, which pursue no obvious public diplomacy 
agenda, are contributing to the U.S. public diplomacy automatically. Many 
American TV programs have started to reach wider Chinese population due to 
growing availability of private TV dishes and the Internet. The Chinese people can 
read major newspapers such as The New York Times and the Washington Post 
online. Major publishing companies in China synchronize cultural and newsworthy 
publications in the U.S. Cultural performances with unique American taste, such as 
jazz performances and Broadway musicals are introduced to the Chinese audience 
by private performing art agencies. There are hundreds of thousands of Chinese 
students learning English language at private American English education institutes 
such as the Wall Street Institute School of English and Berlitz in China. All these 
enriched and omniscient private businesses have been performing an adequate 
public diplomacy function objectively and making the U.S. government-sponsored 
programs such as VOA, Information Resource Center, Educational Advising, and 
Cultural Exchange less and less relevant and more and more symbolic. To some 
extent, a waning government role in U.S. public diplomacy is an institutional and 
economical choice rather than a political nonfeasance.  
 
 Policy Misconception 
Public diplomacy often becomes null in front of incommensurable 
foreign/domestic policy. In the U.S. case, inefficiency of its public diplomacy 
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towards China originates from an incoherent China policy. In public, U.S. officials 
have insisted for years that they do not have a policy to contain China. On January 
14, 2011, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said: ―A thriving America is 
good for China, and a thriving China is good for America. And U.S. friends and 
allies in the Asia-Pacific want to move beyond outdated, zero-sum formulas that 
might force them to choose between relations with Beijing and relations with 
Washington (Clinton, 2011).‖ However, on November 16, 2011, during China-
Philippines disputes over South China Sea, Secretary Clinton announced: ―the 
United States will always be in the corner of the Philippines and we will stand and 
fight with you (Tandon, 2011).‖ Her announcement was accompanied with the 
declaration of the U.S.-Australia agreement to deploy 2,500 Marines in Australia to 
strengthen alliances in Asia, a move that was seen as a signal to balance the 
growing influence of China in the Southeast Asia region. This is just one of many 
cases in which the U.S. government‘s deeds belie its words. Public diplomacy as an 
integral part of the overall diplomacy cannot stand on itself. If U.S.-China policy is 
antagonistic in general, its public diplomacy, no matter how friendly it seems to be, 
will be seen as an expediential distraction.  
For China, inefficiency of its public diplomacy is caused by its domestic 
policy rather than its U.S. policy. Joseph Nye (2012) pertinently pointed out: 
What China seems not to appreciate is that using culture and narrative to create 
soft power is not easy when they are inconsistent with domestic realities…The 
2008 Olympics were a success, but shortly afterwards, China‘s domestic 
crackdown in Tibet and Xianjiang, and on human rights activists, undercut its 
soft power gains. The Shanghai Expo was also a great success, but was 
followed by the jailing of the Nobel peace laureate Liu Xiaobo and the artist Ai 
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Weiwei. And for all the efforts to turn Xinhua and China Central Television 
into competitors for CNN and the BBC, there is little international audience for 
brittle propaganda. Now, in the aftermath of the Middle East revolutions, China 
is clamping down on the Internet and jailing human rights lawyers, once again 
torpedoing its soft power campaign.  
To sum up, it is the Chinese government‘s domestic policy, which is heterogenic to 
the U.S. democratic values, that discredits the Chinese government and makes its 
public diplomacy measures in the U.S. unwelcomed and distrusted. The Chinese 
government has to be seen as a legitimate and righteous government in the eyes of 
the U.S. public before any substantial public diplomacy program can further its 
influence; otherwise, China‘s public diplomacy that aims to project a balanced 
image on China will be seen as an attempt to make believe.  
From a broader viewpoint, inefficiency of U.S.-China public diplomacy is a 
curse of the dilemmatic bilateral relations. The U.S.-China relationship is the most 
important bilateral relationship in the world. Public diplomacy aiming at creating a 
solid basis of mutual understanding between the peoples and minimizing strategic 
misinterpretation is essential for the healthy development of U.S.-China relations 
and the security of the world. However, the importance of this bilateral relationship 
is based more upon strategic deterrence rather than on strategic alliance; and the 
relationship is charged with ideological dichotomy and political sensitivity. 
Therefore, public diplomacy has always been marginalized and overwhelmed by 
strategic planning on hot-button issues, such as arms sales, territorial disputes and 
national security.  
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 Summary 
Generally speaking, three common mistakes are usually made unconsciously in 
comparing U.S.-China public diplomacy. 1) Confusing public diplomacy with 
another form of political communication: propaganda. This mistake is due to 
incoherent and confused theoretical and ideological approaches to public 
diplomacy. 2) Overstressing the role played by the government. The reason for this 
mistake is the institutional compatibility of public diplomacy, which is defined as a 
government-sponsored diplomatic practice, with the political institution of big 
government. 3) Overestimating applicability of public diplomacy. This mistake is 
made if the relations between public diplomacy and overall domestic or foreign 
policy are overlooked. Being mindful of the theoretical, institutional and policy 
misconceptions behind these mistakes can help public diplomacy scholars and 
practitioners evaluate public diplomacy in a more qualitative and comprehensive 
way. 
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